To Fish or Not to Fish: Playing the Game of International Development by Kniffin, Kevin M.
Lehigh University
Lehigh Preserve
The changing face of Argentina Perspectives on Business and Economics
1-1-1995
To Fish or Not to Fish: Playing the Game of
International Development
Kevin M. Kniffin
Lehigh University
Follow this and additional works at: http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v13
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Perspectives on Business and Economics at Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for
inclusion in The changing face of Argentina by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact
preserve@lehigh.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kniffin, Kevin M., "To Fish or Not to Fish: Playing the Game of International Development" (1995). The changing face of Argentina.
Paper 2.
http://preserve.lehigh.edu/perspectives-v13/2
TO FISH OR NOT TO FISH: 
PLAYING THE GAME OF 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT1 
Kevin M. Kniffin 
Introduction 
American children raised in the cult of the 
individual are often posed the following ques-
tion: If everyone else jumped off the Empire 
State building, would you? The trained 
response is "No." In reality, however, most peo-
ple would likely jump if "everyone else does." 
Although Argentina does not share 
America's folklore, it is attempting to become a 
fellow member in the community of "developed 
countries." Argentina's assimilation into this 
group will likely pressure them to "play the game 
of development" with Western rules. In this 
game, participants are required to compete with 
each other, constantly trying to outdo their oppo-
nents. Unfortunately, the competitors are some-
times so preoccupied with their speeds that they 
fail to look down at the road beneath them. This 
paper will attempt to describe the potential pit-
falls on the track of development, focusing on 
the Argentine fishing industry as a case study. 
Argentina's Role in International 
Markets 
Although Argentina met with great suc-
cess in the international trading arena in the 
1800s (Rock), the country has been struggling 
with an unstable economy during the last few 
decades. In order to deal with this instability, 
there are generally two paths that a nation can 
follow. It can focus on becoming self-sufficient, 
without relying on imports; or it can open its 
markets in an attempt to grow in competition 
and cooperation with foreign investors. 
In the 1970s, the Economic Commission 
on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
- a regional branch of the United Nations -
recommended that Argentina engage in a pro-
tectionist, state-subsidized import -substitution 
policy. (Cohen) This policy, however, did not 
produce appreciable growth levels; rather, 
nationalized companies became inefficient 
drains on the national economy. 
1The author wishes to thank Professor John Gatewood and Professor Alvin Cohen of Lehigh University for helpful comments. 
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President Menem has been credited with 
rebuilding Argentina by privatizing industry 
and opening markets to the international com-
munity. The competition involved in interna-
tional markets forces companies to become effi-
cient or bankrupt. Growth becomes prompted 
by external pressures rather than independent 
goals. These pressures of growth, however, can 
have detrimental effects. 
Argentine Fishing Industry 
Common hake is the most abundant fish 
in the Argentine fishing industry, accounting 
for 45.9 percent of the total landed weight in 
1993. Other popular species include blue whit-
ing, squid, and shrimp. While hake catches 
have been consistently around 400,000 metric 
tons (mt) over the past three years, many of the 
other species are being fished at fast -growing 
rates. For example, between 1991 and 1993, 
squid catches increased 318 percent (from 
46,313 to 193,690 mt) and blue whiting catch-
es have increased 149 percent (from 44,142 to 
109,829 mt). (Embassy of the United States, 
1993, p. 2; NMFS, 1994, p. 35) 
Until very recently most of Argentina 's 
catch was landed in Mar Del Plata, a port city 
located 400 kilometers south of Buenos Aires. 
(Embassy of the United States, 1993, p. 1) 
Activity is growing in the southern regions, how-
ever, particularly for factory processing ships, 
which have been involved in the squid fishery. 
In 1992, only 37 percent of the landed 
weight was processed on Argentine soil, mean-
ing almost two-thirds of the country's fish proc-
essing was done offshore, primarily by foreign 
companies. Companies that process fish off-
shore are not legally mandated to use Argentine 
workers (Cortes); therefore, cheaper foreign 
labor is often used. Union pressures helped 
support Argentine laws prescribing that 75 per-
cent of each crew must be national citizens; 
however, the government holds the right to 
grant exemptions. (CEI, p. 38) 
The explosion in squid and pollack pro-
duction has been partially responsible for great 
changes in the Argentine fishing industry 's 
international relationships. In 1992, Spain 
imported 20.8 percent of the volume and Japan 
took 11.8 percent. (Embassy of the United 
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States, 1993, p. 4) In 1993, however, Japan 
imported almost 24 percent of the landed 
weight, while Spain accounted for 14 percent, 
and South Korea for 9.5 percent. (PROMSA) 
The inception of Mercosur - a common 
market that includes Argentina, Brazil , 
Paraguay, and Uruguay - will benefit 
Argentina 's fish production. Specifically, 
Mercosur's reduction of trade tariffs and other 
barriers at the end of 1994 will facilitate trade. 
Already, however, fish exports to Mercosur 
countries have increased greatly (77 .5 percent) 
from 27.9 million US$ in 1992 to 49.5 million 
US$ in 1993. (Ministerio de Economfa ... , May 
1994a, p. 74) Explanation for this trend lies in 
Argentina's ability to supply Brazil 's unmet 
demand for fish. Brazil accounted for 85 per-
cent (42.3 million US$) of the total 1993 
Mercosur imports. (Ministerio de Economia ... , 
May 1994a, p. 74; NMFS, 1994, p. 38) 
History of the Argentine Fishing 
Industry 
Although the current market is experi-
encing great change and growth, it is necessary 
to recognize the historical context of the 
present-day situation. For example, Argentina 
is currently reaping record harvests. In order 
to further understand how Argentina should 
deal with the future , it behooves analysts to 
explore the history of national fishing regula-
tions and international trade agreements. 
As countries increase their fleet sizes, the 
production of fish no longer becomes the main 
problem; rather, the controlled production of 
fish becomes the main issue. Fisheries are lim-
ited, renewable resources that must be protect-
ed unless one wants to risk their irreversible 
destruction. As a result of the need to prevent 
overfishing, Argentina has policies that restrict 
fishing through temporal and territorial condi-
tions, along with limits on gear technology. 
(CEI) These measures, which will be discussed 
in more detail later, help to prevent overfishing. 
Since Argentina does not consume much 
fish (except during Lent), it is necessary for it to 
seek out markets. Initially, it may be difficult to 
find partners; however, in today's global market, 
it is more likely that a country like Argentina 
must "fend off' potential suitors. For example, 
if Argentina allowed the Japanese to fish without 
restrictions in Argentine waters, Japan would 
likely decimate the Argentine fisheries. (Cortes) 
In addition to a recent agreement with the 
European Union, which will be discussed later, 
Argentina has agreed to other international 
arrangements in the past. In December 1986 
Argentina agreed to authorize fishing by ships 
from Bulgaria and the former Soviet Union. 
Although Argentina made sure that it retained 
strict control over the foreign fishing effort, this 
was the first time that Argentina allowed fish-
ing by foreign-flagged vessels. (CEI, p. 5) 
These two agreements also functioned as 
attempts to claim Argentine sovereignty over 
its sea rights. Although sea-neighboring coun-
tries were granted exclusive rights 200 miles 
out from their coasts by the Rights of the Sea 
Convention in 1982, many foreign fishing fleets 
would invade others' territories without legal 
permission. Although illegal fishing is still a 
problem, especially for countries like Argentina 
that have a long coast to monitor, it is becom-
ing less troublesome. Argentina's ability to 
enforce its regulations draws in part on the 
cooperation of other countries to negotiate and 
sign legal agreements. 
Accordingly, Argentina has been entering 
into more international agreements in recent 
years. For example, the government issued 
licenses to Japanese and Taiwanese squid fishers · 
in 1992. The legalization of foreign fishing not 
only allows the host country to benefit financially 
from shared interests, but may also give the host 
nation a greater ability to enforce regulations. 
Tragedy of the Commons 
Applicable to a wide range of policies, 
Hardin's "tragedy of the commons" model offers 
warnings to development planners that "free-
dom in the commons brings ruin to all. " 
(Hardin, p. 1244) Nevertheless, economic pres-
sures often overwhelm more rational tenden-
cies toward restraint. 
Hardin's classic illustration involves a com-
munal cow pasture. Each person in the com-
munity raises a given number of cows on the 
commons. In order to seek a greater profit, 
however, one of the commoners places another 
cow on the land. The addition of the cow takes 
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some of the finite resources of the commons 
away from all of the other cows (and their own-
ers), but the owner does not need to care about 
the other people. The "invisible hands" eventu-
ally lead everyone into disaster, however. 
While the losses incurred by the addition-
al cow's consumption are shared among all of 
the commoners, the original owner makes all 
of the profit. Seeing the profit made by their 
neighbor, the other commoners have no reason 
not to seek the addition of more cows. 
Eventually, however, the strain of the addition-
al cows becomes too great for the land. Not only 
does the land collapse, but the economic actors 
that use the land are left without a theater. 
Unfortunately, the history of fisheries and 
other renewable natural resources offers an 
abundance of examples that fall victim to 
Hardin's scenario. (e.g. , Smith, 1977) When 
given freedom to harvest the sea, fishers will try 
to catch as many fish as possible in as short a 
time as possible with ships as large as possible 
-a symptom of overcapitalization. In order to 
prevent other fishers from getting the finite 
number of fish available, they all rush to cap-
ture as much as possible in order to prevent oth-
ers from landing big catches. (Gordon, p. 135) 
In practice, human greed is often mitigat-
ed by cultural norms that prescribe some degree 
of cooperation (Acheson) or a practical inabili-
ty to exploit resources beyond their sustainable 
yields. (McGoodwin) Nevertheless, in a coun-
try that stresses development there will be a 
focus on increased profit that must be coun-
tered by laws. Of course, the "need" for laws is 
apparent in the fisheries dilemma, but much 
more open to value judgments in other spheres, 
such as human resources. This paper adopts 
the view that there is at least a need to recog-
nize other stresses of development, such as 
increased socioeconomic stratification, regard-
less of the value that people attribute to them. 
International Development 
The problem that countries like Argentina 
face lies in the deregulation of other nations' 
environmental policies. In a global economy, 
each nation's actions have varying effects on 
other nations. If there is simply one country 
willing to let a country like Spain or Japan 
exploit all of the country's fisheries, then a 
country with regulations will likely lose in the 
initial bargaining arrangement. The willing-
ness of countries to offer lax regulations weak-
ens the ability of other countries to draw long-
term commitments, or capital investments. 
For example, if underdeveloped countries coop-
erated to set a standard for trade relations, it is 
likely they would gain much more power in 
negotiations. On a more regional scale, if a 
company looking to relocate had the options of 
moving to a place with strict environmental 
regulations or to a place with lax regulations, 
the pressures of the marketplace will point 
towards the host with lax regulations. In fact, 
much of the debate over NAFTA concerned this 
very point. Many Americans feared that 
Mexico 's relative lack of restrictions would 
"suck" jobs from the United States. 
On the other hand, if countries agreed to 
a standard set of regulations, then companies 
would not be able to play countries against one 
another. While it is unreasonable to expect 
developing countries to accept strict limits from 
developed countries that can afford such 
restrictions, it is worth noting that there are 
some incentives, less tangible than increased 
growth rates, that support a move toward uni-
form regulations. The uniformity of policies 
regarding taxes and environmental regulations, 
for instance, would tend to create a more sta-
ble environment in which companies would not 
always be looking for the lowest bidder. 
Cooperation, rather than competition, between 
countries would allow them to retain capital 
within their countries over long periods of time. 
While it would also retard the movement of cap-
ital to less restrictive countries, the eventual 
movement would be more in accordance with 
the ideal terms of the developing countries' 
contracts. Corporations would not be able to 
ignore the demands of developing countries 
that ask for strong commitments in the form 
of capital investment. This type of policy might 
also attach the owners to the homes of their 
businesses, perhaps inducing greater care for 
the nations' land, sea, and people - care that 
might otherwise be missing among absentee 
capitalists with no long-term commitment to 
local concerns. 
Another model that would seem applica-
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ble to modern nation-states in their develop-
ment schemata is that of the "prisoner's dilem-
ma." In the prisoner's dilemma, two people are 
accused of a crime. If they cooperate with each 
other in silence, they will both avoid a guilty 
sentence. If one defects and reports on the 
other, then the "sneak" will get less of a sen-
tence and the resistant suspect will be punished 
without compassion. If both defect, then they 
will both be punished by the law. 
In a multi-player game, only one defector 
is required to ruin the game for everyone else. 
(Axelrod; Orbell) If one person defects, then 
everyone except the defector loses. In the world 
of industrializing countries, if Argentina and 
every other country were to regulate strictly 
their fisheries and other natural and human 
resources, in theory it would still only require 
one nation to undercut the agreements made by 
everyone else. In practice, issues such as trans-
portation costs and entry capital investments 
would dampen the effects. Nevertheless, the 
prisoner's dilemma proposes that as soon as one 
nation becomes indiscriminant about selling its 
resources, then the other countries will be hard 
pressed not to follow. Thus arises the tragedy of 
the commons on an international scale.2 
Only in the first iteration of the game 
would the defector reap profits. After several 
iterations, it is likely that not only will there be 
other defectors, but also that the original defec-
tor will have likely exploited its resources 
beyond sustainable yields. If it is possible to 
resist the temptation to defect immediately, 
then as defectors drop out of the game over 
time the patient countries become more pow-
erful because there will be fewer competitors. 
Underdeveloped countries, however, are often 
marked by greater turmoil in internal politics 
than industrialized countries. This creates a 
great temptation for those in power to "sell out" 
a sustainable future for the sake of immediate 
2Again, the NAFTA debate is applicable; however, one 
must be aware of the hegemonic dynamics of this game. 
Given the considerable difference in the standards of living 
of the United States and Mexico, it is difficult to expect 
Mexico not to be willing to relax certain regulations in order 
to raise its own standard of living. Essentially, some would 
argue that the United States and other more developed 
countries can "afford" to pay more attention to environ-
mental management than lesser-developed countries. 
gains and a preserved political career. In theo-
ry, the growing tradition of the Argentine 
democracy should allow for more altruistic 
decisions whose visions are broader than those 
made by leaders in unstable countries. 
Nevertheless, without a worldwide gov-
erning agency of natural resources, it is likely 
that there will always be at least one country 
willing to take the "easy money" and give in to 
outsiders ' pressure to exploit resources. The 
"easy money," however, is not based on a sus-
tainable resource. Once the outsiders exploit 
the land and sea beyond efficiency, there is no 
commitment to stay there. On they will go to 
the next country. 
One of the other results of being heavily 
involved in export markets is the emergence of 
dependency. Although market fluctuations can 
benefit Argentina, they can also make business 
difficult. For example, although Argentine hake 
prices have increased in the last few years due 
to shortages in the North Atlantic cod fishery 
(NMFS, 1994, p. 6), a recession in Europe, an 
improvement in European catches, and greater 
Russian groundfish exports have detrimentally 
affected other Argentine exports. (NMFS, 1994, 
p. 7) This instability created by the variety of 
links across the globe makes it very difficult for 
local producers to prepare for problems; for 
countries are dependent not only on other 
countries ' management of resources, but also 
on chance events such as climatic changes. 
Social, Political, and Economic 
Implications of Regulations 
One of the underlying features of devel-
opment plans is the target schedule of progress. 
For example, will growth be appreciated imme-
diately or will patience become a valuable 
virtue? Generally, if one is seeking any long-
term consistent economic return, some 
restraint must be exercised in development. 
Fast, unregulated development plans run the 
risks of creating a "mob mentality," pushing 
speculators over the edge of reason (e.g. , the 
U.S. savings and loan crisis). Although there is 
a relation between economics and biology, one 
need not be a "tree-hugger" to realize that it is 
economically wise to conserve resources. 
Developers should also tip their hats to social 
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scientists who tend to focus more on issues of 
social equity, since inequitable arrangements 
tend to produce unhappy, uncooperative work-
ers. Fricke (1985) notes that comprehensive 
policies require the input of economists, biolo-
gists , and social scientists. Accordingly, 
Gatewood adds that it is important that "each 
fishery management plan reflects locally appro-
priate compromises among conservation, effi-
ciency, and equity concerns. " (1993 , p. 137) 
Although "equity" can be ambiguous, it is still 
necessary to recognize social, biological, and 
economic elements in development plans. 
Neither must the role of international 
political relationships be ignored. Argentina's 
tenuous political relationship with Britain 
could potentially cause harm to the fisheries 
and the fishers. Arguments over a relatively 
small area of sea between Argentina and Las 
Malvinas that is "politically important" to each 
country could lead to a disproportionate invest-
ment of time and energy deciding which coun-
try has the right to protect (and fish) that small 
area, leaving the rest of Argentina's fisheries less 
protected against eager poachers. An editorial 
from The Buenos Aires Herald claims that "we 
can rest assured that [foreign fishing fleets] 
would have a field day if the 99.83 percent of 
the Argentine and British zones go neglected 
by this nonsensical approach to the problem." 
(''Missing What's Essential," p. 12) 
Agreement with the European Union 
Of course, contact with "neighboring 
countries" in today's shrinking world need not 
always be confrontational. On May 24, 1994, 
Argentina signed a fisheries agreement with the 
EU - one of the more recent attempts to link 
Argentina more closely with the industrialized 
West. The agreement allows EU vessels to fish 
in Argentine waters, although the foreign ships 
must be transferred to an Argentine compai y 
within three years if they wish to stay. (NMFS, 
1994, p. 9) Although opinions regarding the 
value of the agreement to Argentina vary, it is 
basically an attempt to gain capital investment 
in exchange for limited fishing rights. The 
agreement lasts for five years and will be 
renewed automatically for two-year intervals, 
unless one of the parties wishes to leave the 
relationshiP,. A Mixed Commission, which has 
yet to meet as of the time of this writing, will 
be responsible for the practical establishment 
and maintenance of the agreement. 
The impetus behind this new agreement 
lies partially in the failure of the Spanish fish-
ing fleet to successfully manage its own fish-
eries. As a result of overcapitalization in the 
Spanish fleet, many vessels needed to be idled. 
Although Namibia became a destination for 
some Spanish fishers , Argentina seemed a 
worthwhile location since Spain previously had 
imported Argentine fish. 
The Spanish had been pushing for the EU 
to reach an agreement with Argentina for sev-
eral years. The agreement had actually been 
initialled by EU Fisheries Commissioner 
Manuel Marin and Argentine President Carlos 
Saul Menem on November 30, 1992. The delay, 
caused by the Argentine Congress, had become 
a cause of concern for some of the Spanish fish-
ers that were desperate to find fishing grounds. 
The Congress, however, was preoccupied with 
constitutional reforms. (NMFS, 1994, p. 18) 
Within the EU, the Spanish were caught 
in a bind since their involvement off the 
Namibia coast did not last long due to Namibia's 
newfound sovereignty over its fishing grounds 
(NMFS, 1994, p. 16); therefore, one of the other 
options outside Spain had been eliminated. 
Although some Spanish are reluctant to enter 
into the Argentine pact, they have few other 
options except for leaving the industry. As 
McGoodwin notes, however, fishers are often 
not in a socio-economic position to change 
occupations easily. Interestingly, Argentina's 
fishers unions are also concerned about the 
agreement. More specifically, they fear that they 
will be forced to compete with the "foreigners. " 
Additionally, they argue that the agreement's 
catch-limit quotas may be too ambitious forcer-
tain species, placing the fisheries and their jobs 
in jeopardy. (NMFS, 1994, p. 13) 
The influx of capital for port and fleet 
improvements mandated by the agreement 
should benefit the aging Argentine fleet. Fifty-
six percent of the fleet's vessels are between 20-
30 years old. (CEI, p. 41) One of the reasons for 
the advanced age is found in the economic cri-
sis of the late 1980s, which was marked by 
hyperinflation, hindering Argentine infrastruc-
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tural investments. (NMFS, 1994, p. 6) 
Nevertheless, skeptics of the EU agreement 
point to the failure of the earlier Soviet agree-
ment to import capital and technology suc-
cessfully. These people contend that the bene-
fits from the EU will also never really be 
actualized. (NMFS, 1994, p. 13) 
The actual fishing rights of the accord 
allow EU vessels to land as much as 250,000 mt 
during the first five years. Broken down by 
species, almost half of the EU fish allocation is 
for hake (120,000 mt). Although the other 
stocks allocated to the EU are surplus fisheries , 
the hake fishery has reached its maximum sus-
tainable yield. Argentine government officials, 
however, state there will be little competition 
for the hake fishery since there are plans to 
transfer the allocations to the EU from 
Argentine ships that have been inactive over the 
past year. (NMFS, 1994, p. 11) The Mixed 
Commission will be responsible for distribut-
ing the allocations to specific fishers. 
Argentina holds the ultimate right to can-
cel licenses at any time if there are concerns 
about overfishing. In fact, the government can-
celed many licenses to fish squid in late 1994. 
(Embassy of the United States, 1994) Although 
it is wise to stop fishing if the resources are in 
jeopardy, the strength of agreements will be 
weakened if Argentina is found guilty of overex-
tending itself. If Argentina cannot uphold its 
end of the agreement, it is doubtful that the 
agreement will last. 
In a capital-driven global economy, it is 
important for countries rich in natural 
resources to attract capital investments from 
partners to help ensure long-term commit-
ments. Without this sharing of capital, the more 
powerful party can simply leave the arrange-
ment without having much difficulty finding 
another partner. Metaphorically, the less pow-
erful member should attempt to force partners 
to "buy its cows before giving them milk. " 
Argentina's attempt to draw commitment is 
found in the requirement that EU ships must 
become registered under the Argentine flag 
within three years and that joint ventures be set 
up between national and foreign investors. This 
prevents the participation of absentee capital-
ists, who would have few incentives to leave any 
profits in Argentina. 
The implementation of this new agree-
ment should prove interesting since there are 
many unanswered questions that only time and 
action will answer. (NMFS, 1994, p. 20) The 
remainder of this article will attempt to delin-
eate these questions and offer some potential 
solutions. 
Is There a Tragedy in the Argentine 
Fisheries? 
To be successful", any plan for conserving 
fisheries must contain three vital points. First, 
biologists must calculate the proper maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY). Secondly, a suitable 
management plan must be chosen that attempts 
to distribute limited fishing rights among fish-
ers (see Gatewood, 1993; McGoodwin, 1990). 
Thirdly, the enforcement of laws must be great 
enough to allow the plans to work within their 
parameters. As mentioned previously, if the sec-
ond point is met successfully and resources are 
distributed with an acceptable degree of equity, 
then the third point becomes less cumbersome. 
The first obstacle - determining the MSY-
however, can cause real problems. 
Ideally, the estimation of the MSY can be 
regarded as a scientifically determined constant 
since the second and third points are challeng-
ing enough. Unfortunately, there has been 
debate even over the MSYs in Argentina. Given 
that fish are fugitive, invisible resources, how-
ever, it is not surprising that the estimation of 
fish stocks is not perfect. Problems are already 
being encountered in the squid and blue whit-
ing fisheries (NMFS, 1994, p. 5), but some 
developers remain undaunted by signs that cer-
tain fisheries are in danger of ruin. Some peo-
ple have claimed that Argentina can land 
5,000,000 mt per year (PROMSA) since some 
species such as anchovy are underexploited. 
Though this claim may seem ridiculous con-
sidering that there already seem to be problems 
when the catch has yet to reach 1,000,000 mt, 
it is indicative of the pressure to fish more. 
The government relies on statistics from 
the Instituto Nacional de Investigacines y 
Desarollo Pesquero (INIDEP) for calculations 
of the MSY, but these reports are not available 
to the public. Interpretation of INIDEP biolo-
gists' reports, which are likely to offer ranges of 
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acceptable landings, may lead to politically-
influenced decisions. For example, squid catch-
es were considered to be sustainable between 
250,000-300,000 mt per year, depending on the 
source. (Ministerio de Economia ... , 1994b, p. 
88; CEI, p. 29) The whole of the range of MSYs 
for squid, however, has been shown to be over-
ly optimistic. Specifically, 1993's official catch 
of only 193,690 (PROMSA) seems to have led to 
difficulties in 1994, which forced the govern-
ment to cancel licenses for squid fishing before 
the season would normally end. (Embassy of the 
United States, 1994) 
Whether 1994's difficulties arose from 
miscalculated MSYs or from illegal fishing is 
impossible to conclude.3 Regardless of the 
source of the problem, the cancellation of squid 
licenses in 1994 is an indication that the explod-
ing growth rates of some of the Argentine fish-
eries may well be unsustainable. Fish stocks 
must be recalculated each year; therefore, a 
commitment to a given number of fish for an 
extended period of time is inadvisable. 
Although Argentina has reserved the right to 
cancel licenses, it has already been mentioned 
that contracts are likely to dissolve if one of the 
partners cannot meet its promise. For exam-
ple, since Argentina was forced to cancel squid 
licenses, it is natural to suspect that there will 
be some reluctance within the EU to fulfill its 
side of the agreement. As mentioned above, 
management must successfully meet all three 
points to insure long-term success. 
Aquaculture -A Solution? 
Efforts to increase fish production have 
recently focused on aquaculture, or fish farm-
ing. Without placing a strain on the natural 
fish reserves, artificially created lakes can pro-
duce a great amount of fish, given the proper 
environments. 
In the case of Argentina, however, aqua-
culture has been moving slowly for two reasons. 
(NMFS, 1991) Tropical shrimp aquaculture, 
which has been successful in other parts of 
South America, is the most appealing cultur-
3According to Cortes (1994) , the Argentine Coast Guard 
arrests between 20 and 25 boats fishing without permission 
each year. He says fines total about 6 million dollars. 
able species; yet, the temperate climate prevents 
Argentina from becoming competitive with 
other countries that have more suitable, tropi-
cal climates. 
While climate precludes the development 
of a competitive shrimp industry, the inability 
to discover a stable, indigenous, marketable 
species for aquaculture is also limiting devel-
opment. Since Argentina will likely need to find 
a new species for aquaculture to be efficient and 
competitive in the global markets, it will also 
be necessary to revolutionize the field. This not 
only requires financial investment, but knowl-
edge about new species must be gained as well. 
This accumulation of knowledge , however, 
requires time. 
The production of fish via aquaculture is 
not expected to be substantial in the next 
decade at least. A report from the National 
Marine Fisheries Service of the United States 
concludes that "based upon the experiences of 
other Latin American countries , any rapid 
expansion of the industry in Argentina appears 
unlikely." (NMFS, 1991, p. 4) 
Conclusion 
The ability of Argentina to effectively man-
age its fisheries without falling to the pressures 
elicited by short-term gains is partially contin-
gent on the actions of its neighbors. While the 
overfishing of the Spanish fisheries inevitably 
led to the arguably favorable position of 
Argentina in the bargaining process , 
Argentina's position is weakened by the pres-
ence of other competing countries that do not 
strictly regulate fishing, or other natural renew-
able resources. 
The emergence of larger international 
trade groups such as Mercosur, the EU, and the 
NAFTA is part of a move towards a global mar-
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ket that could be regulated without concern for 
single country's actions; however, that time has 
not yet arrived. Although the lack of competi-
tion does not necessarily mean that countries, 
or groups of countries, will not overfish, it 
would be easier for people to resist the tempta-
tion of short-term gains. The international reg-
ulation of natural resources can be just as dif-
ficult as internal regulation, if not more so. 
Ironically, the relationship between 
Argentina and Great Britain demonstrates 
many of the dynamics that need to be recog-
nized. Great Britain, a member of the group 
partially responsible for the overexploitation of 
Argentina's fisheries- the EU- has expressed 
concern that too much fishing by the EU in 
Argentina will hurt Great Britain's fisheries 
development in the Falklands. Although Great 
Britain 's concerns are motivated by selfish 
interests, it is effective at proving the idea that 
the world's fisheries belong to everyone. 
Fighting to grab "pieces of the pie" often 
results in a mess rather than a table surround-
ed by satisfied individuals. Without regulation, 
the incessant quest for profits would likely turn 
the sea and land into a mess. Regulation can 
not only prevent environmental destruction, 
but social destruction as well. It is in the mutu-
al interests of all countries to prevent the abuse 
of natural and human resources. Returning to 
our question about following others ready to 
jump off a skyscraper, if one wants to imagine 
a group of developers meeting on top of the 
Empire State building, it would seem necessary 
to erect fences around the roof to keep people 
from jumping. Even better than fences as self-
protective barriers, however, would be self-con-
trol taught to the developers by the "tragedies" 
of history - lessons that allow them to recog-
nize the height of the building before perching 
themselves on the ledge. 
REFERENCES 
Acheson, James M. The Lobster Gangs of Maine. Hanover, 
NH: University Press of New England, 1988. 
Axelrod, Robert M. The Evolution of Cooperation. New 
York: Basic Books, 1984. 
Centro de Economfa Internacional (CEI). "Argentina's 
Fishery Industries." Argentina Economic Report, 
1984, no. 10. 
Cohen, Alvin. Professor of Economics, Lehigh University, 
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, Interview, Fall1994. 
Cortes, Ing. Marcelo Ferrada. Asesor Pesquero, Secretarfa 
de Agricultura, Ganaderfa, y Pesca, Buenos Aires, 
Interview, August 25, 1994. 
Embassy of the United States. Report on the Fishing 
Industry. Buenos Aires, 1993. 
Embassy of the United States. Report on the Argentine 
Fishing Industry, Buenos Aires, 1994. 
Fricke, Peter H. "Use of Sociological Data in the Allocation 
of Common Property Resources." Marine Policy, 9, 
1985, pp. 39-52. 
Gatewood, John B. "Ecology, Efficiency, Equity, and 
Competitiveness," in Steven L. Goldman, ed . 
Competitiveness and American Society, Bethlehem, 
PA: Lehigh University Press, 1993. 
Gordon, H. Scott. "The Economic Theory of a Common 
Property Resource: The Fishery." Journal of Political 
Economy, 62, 1954, pp. 124-42. 
13 
Hardin, Garrett J. "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science, 
162, 1968, pp. 1243-48. 
McGoodwin, James R. Crisis in the World's Fisheries. 
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. 
Ministerio de Economfa y Obras y Servicios Pub li cos. 
Republica Argentina: Economic Report, May 1994a. 
Ministerio de Economfa y Obras y Servicios Publicos. 
Argentina: A Country for Investment and Growth, 
1994b. 
"Missing What's Essential." Buenos Aires Herald, August 
26, 1994, p. 12. 
Orbell, John. "The Experimental Study of Social Dilemma 
Behavior." CogSciNews, 1990, pp. 4-6. 
Programa de Modernizaci6n de los Servicios Agropecuarios 
(PROMSA) , Exportaciones del Sector Pesquero 
Argentino 1993, 1994. 
Rock, David. Argentina: 1516-1987. California: University 
of California Press, 1987. 
Smith, Courtland L. "Fisheries as Subsistence Resources: 
Growth and Decline of the Columbia River Salmon 
Fishery," in M. E. Smith, ed. Those Who Live from 
the Sea. St. Paul: West Publishing, 1977. 
United States National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 
Argentine Shrimp Culture, 1991. 
United States National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 
Argentine-European Fisheries Agreement, 1994. 
